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CORNERSTONE INVESTORS AND
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS ON THE
STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG
Chee Keong Low ∗
ABSTRACT
The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong had an exuberant year in 2006
when it listed sixty-two companies. The listing of the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China Limited on its Main Board earned the
exchange the enviable status of being home to the world’s largest
initial public offering. The HK$333.2 billion in initial public
offering capital raised during the year propelled it to the position of
second among global exchanges, behind London but ahead of New
York.
This Article examines an increasingly common feature of initial
public offerings in Hong Kong, namely, the introduction of
“cornerstone investors” whose participation enhances the general
receptiveness to a stock offering. This approach does have a
significant downside, however. The new category of “cornerstone
investor” may not be completely consistent with the principles of
equity of the Listing Rules in Hong Kong.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2006 was considered the “Year of Records” for the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong (the “SEHK”). 1 On December 28, 2006, the
last trading day of that year, the aggregate market capitalization of the
1,173 listed companies totaled a record HK$13,339.9 billion 2 (approximately US$1.71 trillion). 3 The Hang Seng Index, the benchmark of the
SEHK, closed at a record 20001.91 points. 4 Trading was extremely
robust throughout the year. Numerous records were set with total market turnover (approximately HK$8.38 trillion), average daily turnover
(approximately HK$33.9 billion), and single-month turnover (approxi1. See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., MARKET STATISTICS 2006,
http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/0701122news.xls
[hereinafter
MARKET
STATISTICS 2006] (statistics and analysis in this Article cover a period of establishment
of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong starting from April 1986 through December 31,
2006).
2. See id. There were 975 companies listed on the Main Board and another 198
on the Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”) as of December 31, 2006. Sometimes commentators in Hong Kong refer to the GEM as the “Second Board” due to its objective of
providing an alternative listing mechanism for companies that do not meet the stricter
quantitative and/or qualitative requirements for a listing on the Main Board governed by
Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Ltd.
See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., RULES GOVERNING THE LISTING OF
SECURITIES ON THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG LIMITED, http://www.hkex.com.
hk/rule/listrules/listrules.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) [hereinafter LISTING RULES].
A further set of rules, namely the Rules Governing the Listing of Securities on the
Growth Enterprise Market of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, Ltd. (the “GEM
RULES”), apply to issuers seeking a listing on the Growth Enterprise Market. See
GROWTH ENTERPRISE MARKET, http://www.hkgem.com/root/e_default.asp (last visited
Feb. 4, 2009); see also C. K. Low, A Brave New World: The Stock Exchange of Hong
Kong Holds Court, 21 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 8, 464 (2006) (arguing that these
rules are contractual by nature).
3. The Hong Kong dollar (HK$) trades at a range of HK$7.75 to HK$7.85 per
U.S. dollar (US$). This paper uses an exchange rate of US$1 to HK$7.80 as this was
the best rate rounded up to two decimal points as quoted on Jan. 15, 2007. See
Exchange Rates Table for American Dollar, http://www.x-rates.com/d/USD/table.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2009); cf. Currency Board System, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma/
eng/currency/link_ex/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
4. See HANG SENG INDEXES CO. LTD., http://www.hsi.com.hk (last visited Jan. 29,
2009) (providing an overview of the constituents and computation of the different
indices). The benchmark Hang Seng Index is comprised of 39 companies as of Dec. 4,
2006. See FAFs and Weightings of HSI Constituents, http://main.hsi.com.hk/hsicom/
new/faf_weightings_e.xls (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
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mately HK$1.08 trillion). 5 Records were also set with equity capital
raised during initial public offerings (“IPOs”) at HK$333.2 billion 6 and
total equity capital at HK$505.9 billion. 7 In addition, the SEHK became
home to the largest IPO in the world with its successful listing of the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China on October 27, 2006. 8 The
SEHK listed 2,823 new derivative warrants during 2006, contributing
roughly HK$1.79 trillion (US$229.5 billion) in trading turnover. 9
A significant contributor to Hong Kong’s explosive market dynamics in 2006 was the enthusiasm for the listings of H-shares 10 , which are
foreign shares issued with a nominal value in Renminbi by Mainland
Chinese companies that are listed on the SEHK and traded in Hong
Kong Dollars. 11 The increasing importance of such companies to the
continued prominence of SEHK as one of the world’s leading stock exchanges 12 is highlighted by the fact that the top ten IPOs on the SEHK in
5. See MARKET STATISTICS 2006, supra note 1. The corresponding amounts in
U.S. currency are about US$1.05 trillion, US$4.35 billion and US$138.46 billion,
respectively. For convenience, all of these amounts have been rounded up to the second
decimal point.
6. See id.
7. See id. The amount raised from IPOs during 2006 was approximately
US$42.72 billion, while the total equity capital raised was about US$64.86 billion.
8. See Chris Oliver, ICBC offering raises $19 billion; world’s biggest IPO,
MARKETWATCH, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?
guid=%7B1C3D03AC-5988-4646-B8CB-571483B78682%7D&siteid=mktw.
9. See MARKET STATISTICS 2006, supra note 1. The previous records were set in
2005 when the 1,682 newly listed derivative warrants contributed towards HK$856.6
billion or about US$109.82 billion in trading turnover. Id.
10. See generally LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at ch. 19A, available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_19A.pdf (defining H shares as “overseas
listed foreign shares which are listed on the Exchange”).
11. The Renminbi, or “RMB,” is the currency of the People’s Republic of China,
which had, until July 21, 2005, been officially pegged to the U.S. Dollar at the rate of
US$1 equal to RMB8.28. See, e.g., Richard McGregor, China ends renminbi’s decadeold peg to dollar, FIN. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/
f56082a0-f9d9-11d9-b092-00000e2511c8.html. The RMB has since appreciated steadily and consistently to the exchange rate of US$1 to RMB7.80, which is at parity to the
Hong Kong dollar. This paper will be using this rate as this was the best rate rounded
up to two decimal points. See XE – Universal Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/
ucc/convert.cgi (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). Although RMB denominated accounts may
be maintained at selected banks in Hong Kong the currency is not freely convertible.
See Wikipedia, Renmibi, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renminbi (last visited Feb. 5,
2009).
12. With a 63.1 percent increase in aggregate market capitalization of its listed
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2006 involved the sale of H-shares, each of which raised more than
HK$20 billion (US$2.56 billion), individually. 13 The trading of Hshares also accounted for eight of the top ten largest listed companies in
terms of turnover in 2006. 14 Their combined annual turnover of
HK$1.81 trillion (US$232 billion) represented approximately 21.6
percent of the total market turnover achieved by all companies listed on
the SEHK in 2006, the significance of which is amplified by the fact that
two of these eight companies were only listed since June 1 of that year.15
Even amidst growing concerns over the state of the IPO market in
the United States, 16 a rising sense of energy in Hong Kong brought to
the foreground a number of related issues, including the high rates of
over-subscription and the extent of under pricing. 17 This Article
examines yet another dimension of IPOs that gained prominence in
Hong Kong throughout 2006, namely, the increasing incidence of the
introduction of “cornerstone investors” 18 , whose participation in an IPO
is viewed positively, particularly amongst retail investors. 19 While
companies during 2006, the SEHK (referred to as Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing)
ranks sixth globally behind the New York Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange,
Nasdaq Stock Market, London Stock Exchange, and Euronext. See FOCUS, WORLD
FED’N OF EXCH., Jan. 2007, available at http://www.world-exchanges.org/publications/
Focus107.pdf.
13. See MARKET STATISTICS 2006, supra note 1, at 14.
14. See Id. at 15.
15. H-Shares of the Bank of China, Ltd. and the Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China were listed on June 1, 2006 and Oct. 27, 2006, respectively. HKExnews New
Listing Report 2006, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/reports/newlisting/2006.
XLS.
16. See, e.g., Henry Blodget, How U.S. IPOs Lost Their Pop, NEWSWEEK INT’L,
May 15, 2006, at 44.
17. See C. K. Low, The Duties of Directors in ‘Irrationally Exuberant’ Initial
Public Offerings, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 89, 99, 108 (2007).
18. See Prospectus of Bank of China, Ltd 114-19, available at http://www.hkex
news.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060518/3988/F115_e.pdf (providing typical descriptions of cornerstone investors); Kate Linebaugh, Hong Kong Elite Score on IPOs –
Tycoons Received Star Treatment; Big Allotments Are Now Criticized But Once Helped
Deals Get Done, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Linebaugh, Star
Treatment]; Kate Linebaugh, Chinese IPO Gets Star Investors, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25,
2006, at C4 [hereinafter Linebaugh, Star Investors].
19. A typical IPO in Hong Kong comprises two tranches namely “International
Placing Shares” and “Hong Kong Offer Shares” which are commonly referred to as the
“International Offer Shares” and “Public Offer Shares” respectively. The former is
reserved for institutional investors, while Hong Kong Offer Shares is the “retail
tranche” of the IPO that is available for direct subscription by the general public. The
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acknowledging that such investors may contribute to the success of the
IPO, this Article points out that the creation of this new category of
investor violates the spirit of the regulatory framework in Hong Kong.
II. A PRIMER ON LISTING IN HONG KONG 20
The SEHK is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hong Kong Exchanges
and Clearing Limited, the latter of which is itself a for-profit public
company that was listed by way of introduction on the SEHK in July
2000. 21 The principal function of the SEHK is to provide a fair, efficient
and orderly market for the trading of securities; it is empowered to prescribe such requirements for companies seeking or maintaining a listing
as are necessary to attain these objectives. 22 These requirements are set
out in separate but broadly similar Listing Rules for the Main Board and
the Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”) of the SEHK. 23
The GEM is essentially designed to provide emerging enterprises –
companies that have good business ideas and growth potential, but
which do not meet the profitability or track record requirements of the
Main Board of the SEHK – with access to the capital markets. 24 Its
launch coincided with the technology boom of the late 1990s, during
which there was an apparent need for such a market to facilitate the listing of low profitability/high growth potential companies in Hong Kong
and Mainland China. Investing on the GEM thus involves greater risk,
premised on the principle of caveat emptor, or “buyer beware”, which is
evidenced by its greater volatility vis-à-vis the Main Board.
Despite its relative success in raising approximately HK$45 billion
(US$5.8 billion) for the 220 companies that listed between the year of its
inception and 2005, the GEM has nonetheless suffered a steady decline

term “retail investor” refers to members of the public who submit direct applications for
the Hong Kong Share Offer portion of IPOs. See Low, supra note 17, at n.10.
20. See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., LISTING IN HONG KONG: A
QUALITY MARKET (2008), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/issuer/listhk/Aug08_
LIHK_E.pdf (providing an overview of the listing process and continuing obligations
thereafter).
21. See HONG KONG EXCHS. & CLEARING, LTD., LISTING DOCUMENT (June 27,
2000), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/relation/lstdoc/lstdoc.htm.
22. See Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, 2003, Cap. 571, §§21-24
(H.K.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm.
23. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2.
24. Id. at chs. 11, 24-25 (describing the goal and purpose of the GEM).
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in recent years. 25 The majority of GEM listed securities presently trade
below their IPO price; the companies experienced losses or prolonged
periods of suspensions which contributed to the general market illiquidity. 26 This prompted the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited to consult the market on the possible restructuring of GEM in
January 2006 to determine the approach that best suits the present needs
of the various stakeholders. 27 The scope of this Article will thus focus
exclusively on IPOs on the Main Board of the SEHK.
Although an IPO is the most common mode of seeking a listing on
the SEHK, it is not the only method. A “placing” or an “introduction”
may be considered under appropriate circumstances. 28 A “placing” is
the obtaining of subscriptions for, or the sale of shares by, a company or
intermediary primarily from or to selected persons, the criteria for which
is set out in Appendix 6 of the Listing Rules titled Placing Guidelines
for Equity Securities. 29 An “introduction” is the ideal method for the
listing of companies whose shares are so widely held that adequate
marketability can be assumed. 30 An introduction is particularly appropriate for companies seeking a secondary listing in Hong Kong. 31 In
every case, the company must satisfy both the quantitative and qualitative criteria that are set out in Chapter 8 of the Listing Rules.32
The SEHK mandates that at least 25 percent of the company’s
shares be held by investors who are independent of the directors and
substantial shareholders of the company in order to ensure an adequate

25. See HONG KONG EXCHS. AND CLEARING, LTD., Discussion Paper on the Growth
Enterprise Market 3 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.hkex.com.hk/consul/paper/
gemdp_e.PDF.
26. See id.
27. See id at 1.
28. The IPO could proceed by way of either an offer for subscription by the company that involves the new issue of shares or an offer for sale by its existing shareholders. Proceeds from the former will go to the company while the vendor shareholders will be the main beneficiaries of the offer for sale. See LISTING RULES, supra
note 2, at ch. 7.
29. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at vol. 2 app. 6.
30. Id. at R. 7.13.
31. Id. at R. 7.14(1).
32. Id. at ch. 8. These criteria should be read in conjunction with the “General
Principles” that are set out in Rules 2.03 to 2.06 which emphasize matters such as the
maintenance of a fair and orderly market, ensuring fair and equal treatment of investors
and keeping them fully informed, and having directors meet their fiduciary obligations.
See id. at ch. 2.
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open market for the freely transferable shares for which listing is
sought. 33 This threshold may be reduced to as low as 15 percent at the
discretion of the SEHK for companies whose market capitalization will
exceed HK$10 billion (US$1.28 billion) on the date of their listing. 34
Apart from the regulatory framework, any decision to list a company will be driven by an assessment of whether the proposed terms of
the IPO are acceptable to both the company and its targeted investors.
This consideration has gravitated toward an objective and easily ascertainable benchmark: the pricing of the IPO. The SEHK adopts a system
that combines both book building and public offers to provide companies and their underwriters with more flexibility in securing sufficient
interest for an IPO. 35
Book building is an important price discovery mechanism because
it allows for the advance gathering of indications of interest from across
a wide spectrum of potential investors. 36 Central to the book building
process is the ability of the underwriter to control the allocation of
shares, so long as the shares are sold at the same price. This process
involves the company and its underwriter setting an initial price range
and inviting bids for its shares during the “road show” to promote its
forthcoming IPO. Investors respond by indicating both the number of
shares sought as well as the price that they are willing to pay. Thus,
with proper coordination, book building can effectively enable the
company and its underwriter to reduce the risks associated with the IPO
by securing guarantees from investors to buy a sufficient number of the
shares. 37
To ensure the broadest possible spread of shareholding for the
“Public Offer” portion of the IPO and to enhance the fair treatment of
investors, the SEHK has mandated the establishment of a “two pool”
system for the allocation of shares in all IPOs. 38 Under this system, the

33.
34.
35.

Id. at R. 8.08.
Id. at 8.08(1)(d).
See Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building versus
Auctions with Endogenous Entry, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 615 (2005) (reviewing the
differences between various modes for IPOs and giving a review of finance literature on
the subject).
36. Id. at 616.
37. Id. at 615.
38. See THE STOCK EXCH. OF HONG KONG, LTD., PRACTICE NOTE 18 TO THE RULES
GOVERNING THE LISTING OF SECURITIES (June 26, 1998), available at http://www.
hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/PN18.doc [hereinafter PRACTICE NOTE 18]. Practice Note 18
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total number of shares that are available for public subscription under
the IPO is divided equally into two pools, “Pool A” and “Pool B”. 39 The
former must be allocated on an equitable basis to those subscribing for
shares with a value of $5 million or less, while the latter applies on the
same basis for those whose applications exceed a value of $5 million. 40
Where one of the pools is under-subscribed, the surplus shares must be
transferred from the under-subscribed pool to the other and allocated
accordingly. 41 This system is further refined in the following manner
when the IPO involves a placing tranche: 42
•
•

•

•

The subscription tranche should be no less than 10 percent
of the shares offered in the IPO;
This will increase to 30 percent via a clawback mechanism
should the subscription tranche be oversubscribed by
between 15 and 50 times;
The threshold will be further increased to 40 percent where
the rate of oversubscription is between 50 and 100 times;
and
At least 50 percent of the shares must be available for allocation under the subscription tranche if the oversubscription rate exceeds 100 times. In such an event, both
the placing and the subscription tranches would comprise
the same number of shares. 43

applies to the retail portion of the IPO, which is available for direct subscription by the
general public.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 2. This placing tranche is also generally known as the “International
Placing Shares” or “International Offer Shares”, which is set aside for the book building
process during which the company and its advisers will organize road shows for institutional investors. Under normal circumstances, this placing tranche will constitute 90
percent of the total number of shares offered during the IPO, although companies may
apply for a waiver of strict compliance with Practice Note 18 to increase this proportion
to a maximum of 95 percent.
43. Id. Investors may choose to apply for shares in either the placing tranche or the
subscription tranche, or for both tranches should these be completed simultaneously.
However, to ensure fairness in the event of the latter, shares may only be allocated to
the investor from either the placing or the subscription tranche but not from both.
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The foregoing “clawback” provisions do not apply to over-allotment or “green shoe” options that are granted to the underwriter, who
retains sole discretion on how they are to be allocated. 44
III. A REVIEW OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN 2006
The fifty-three IPOs during 2006 raised a collective total of approximately HK$332.1 billion (US$42.6 billion) in new equity capital. 45
However, not all of funds raised are received by the company, as the
IPO may comprise a combination of an offer for subscription as well as
an offer for sale. While the company receives money from an offer for
subscription, it is the existing shareholders who benefit from an offer for
sale, since this involves the disposal of a portion of their shareholding. 46
Although the average size of the fifty-three IPOs during 2006 was
approximately HK$6.3 billion (US$803 million), the range was signifycantly larger, between HK$11 million (US$1.4 million) raised by
Winbox International (Holdings) Limited 47 and about HK$125 billion
(US$16 billion) by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Limited, the largest IPO in the world. 48 The successful listing of the
44. See, e.g., Investopedia, Greenshoe Option, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
g/greenshoe.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). It is customary for companies to grant
greater than 15 percent of the number of offer shares to its underwriters under such a
“green shoe” or over-allotment option which may be exercised at the discretion of the
underwriter within 30 days of the close of the IPO; Franze SA & Schlag C, Overallotment Options in IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Market – An Empirical Investigation
(CFS Working Paper No. 2002/16), available at http://www.soc.uoc.gr/econ/static_
content/seminars/Schlag.pdf.
45. See New Listing Report 2006, supra note 15.
46. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at R. 7.01-.08. The existing shareholders of
seven companies sold some of their shares as part of the IPO in 2006. These “sale” or
“existing shares” were offered for sale by the existing shareholders of Fortune Sun
(China) Holdings Limited (the shareholders of which sold 20.28 million “sale shares”
during the IPO before the exercise of over-allotment options), Greentown China
Holdings Limited (25.974 million), Hembly International Holdings Limited (7.2
million), Smart Union Group (Holdings) Limited (12 million), AUPU Group Holding
Company Limited (34 million), Neo-Neon Holdings Limited (40 million), and The
Ming An (Holdings) Company Limited (99 million). See id.
47. See New Listing Report 2006, supra note 15.
48. See Oliver, supra note 8. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd.,
attained the distinction of being the first company to be simultaneously listed on the
SEHK and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This amount of HK$125 billion pertains
to that which the company raised on the SEHK.
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China provides further irrefutable
evidence of the increasing importance of companies that are incorporated in the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and to the continued
prominence of the SEHK as one of the top ten stock exchanges globally
in terms of market capitalization.
Appendix I sets out the details of the fifty-three IPOs of 2006. It is
noteworthy that the top five fundraisers for the year collectively raised
some HK$266 billion (US$34.1 billion), accounted for 80 percent of the
total funds raised from IPOs during 2006, and all involved the sale of
“H-shares”: the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited,
Bank of China Limited, China Communications Construction Company
Limited, China Coal Energy Company Limited and China Merchants
Bank Company Limited. 49 An emerging facet of IPOs in Hong Kong,
particularly with the larger sized issues and those involving the sale of
H-shares, is the increasing prominence of corporate investors, also referred to as “cornerstone investors”. The practice of allocating a specified number of shares to cornerstone investors during an IPO in Hong
Kong is substantially different from the practice of “spinning”, 50 which
was evident in the United States during the height of the dot-com technology boom of the late 1990s. 51 In essence, “spinning” involves the
directing of highly sought after shares during IPOs to preferred clients,
assuring those clients of instant profits when they sell the shares immediately upon the commencement of trading. 52 In return, the under49. See infra app. I. Each of the top five IPOs raised more than HK$15 billion or
US$1.923 billion. In fact, the 17 H-Shares that were listed on the SEHK in 2006 raised
a combined total of HK$290 billion (US$37.2 billion), accounting for approximately
87.3 percent of the total funds raised for the year. The two largest listings, namely
those of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Bank of China, raised a
combined total of HK$211.7 billion (US$27.1 billion), comprising about 73 percent of
the total value of H-Share IPOs for 2006.
50. The data of cornerstone investors was hand collected and compiled with a
review of all the prospectuses that were issued by companies seeking a listing over a
five-year period from 2002 through 2006. This desk survey by the author indicated a
marked absence of such investors prior to the year 2006. See, e.g., infra notes 60, 12025 [hereinafter Desk Survey].
51. See Morrison & Foerster, “Spinning” IPO Shares: The eBay Decision, Feb.
2004, http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update1162.html [hereinafter eBay
Decision]; see also News Release, NASD Charges Frank Quattrone with Spinning,
Undermining Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to Cooperate in Investigation (Mar.
6, 2003), http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2003NewsReleases/NASDW
_002948.
52. eBay Decision, supra note 51.
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writers are promised lucrative advisory work or high commission trades
on other stocks, a practice that has been viewed recently by the Supreme
Court of New York as “a sophisticated form of bribery.” 53
The rationale for the introduction of cornerstone investors during
IPOs is based on the perception that the credibility of some of the
companies that are going public needs to be enhanced. 54 Public investors may also be concerned about the standards of corporate governance practiced by the companies, as well as the level of transparency or
reliability of their accounts. The presence of household names as cornerstone investors is thus often viewed as an implicit seal of approval,
since the list includes some of the richest tycoons in Hong Kong. By
committing their own funds – or funds of companies in which they have
controlling interest – and by agreeing not to dispose of the shares so
allotted within a specified “lock-up” period 55 , these cornerstone investors boost confidence and deliver a positive signal to the market. In
addition, their participation reduces the number of shares that have to be
sold on the open market, which not only promotes the success of the IPO
but also upholds a degree of confidence in the stability of the company’s
share price thereafter.
Nevertheless, the presence of cornerstone investors raises two related issues: (i) whether such arrangements benefit the company going
public, and (ii) whether they breach applicable regulations. The ensuing
sections of this Article argue that while the allocations to cornerstone
investors do not breach the letter of the law if there is adequate disclosure of such arrangements, there is nonetheless a need to rethink the
rules to enhance the principles of equity during an IPO. This Article
concludes with a proposal that strikes a balance between the interests of
the various stakeholders, without requiring any burdensome change to
the regulatory framework.

53. See State v. McLeod, 12 Misc. 3 1157(A), 1 (2006); State v. McLeod,
Settlement Agreement in the Supreme Court of the State of New York (2006), available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2006/jul/McLeod%20Settlement%20Stipulation.
pdf.
54. See infra notes 120-25.
55. The “lock-up” period refers to the period of time that the cornerstone investor
agrees not to dispose of the shares and is the quid pro quo for being accorded a
preferential status in the allotment of the shares by the company. See infra note 59; see
also Prospectus of the Bank of China, Ltd., supra note 18, at 114-19 (typical description
of cornerstone investors and of the “lock up period”).

650

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INCIDENCE OF CORNERSTONE INVESTORS
A company’s decision whether to invite the participation of cornerstone investors in its IPO is essentially a commercial one. The principal
regulatory criterion is that the cornerstone investors must be independent
from both the company and the controlling shareholders. 56 Once the
decision is made, the company and cornerstone investors enter into corporate placing agreements in which the cornerstone investors irrevocably agree to subscribe for as many shares as may be purchased with a
fixed amount of investment. The exact number of shares ultimately depends on the final price set for the IPO, and this number is then rounded
down to the nearest “board lot” to facilitate trading. 57
All the pertinent details of these arrangements must be prominently
disclosed in the prospectus. To assess the extent of participation of cornerstone investors, a desk survey was conducted of the prospectuses
from the website of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing, the primary purpose of which was to ascertain, among other things: (a) the
identity of the cornerstone investors and the quantum of their investment; (b) the number of shares that were placed to them and the restricttions imposed thereon; and (c) the effect of such arrangements on both
the institutional and retail tranches of the IPO. 58 Table 1 below presents
a snapshot of the results of the desk survey.

56. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, Rules 8.07-.08 (requirement for assuring an
adequate and open market for the securities that are listed).
57. A “board lot” is the number of shares that are traded for a particular company
through the electronic trading system of the SEHK. There is no uniform size of board
lots in Hong Kong; this number may be determined from time to time by the company.
For example HSBC Holdings plc (Stock Code Number 5) has a trading board lot of 400
shares while its 62 percent owned subsidiary Hang Seng Bank Limited (Stock Code
Number 11) has a board lot of 100 shares. The trading of “odd lots”, namely where the
quantity of shares do not amount to a “board lot”, is generally done over-the-counter
between buyers and sellers. See Hong Kong Exchs., Market Operations & Infrastructure, http://www.hkex.com.hk/infra1.htm (last visited Feb 6, 2009) (for an overview of the securities trading and settlement systems in Hong Kong).
58. To facilitate the widest possible dissemination of pertinent corporate
information, the prospectuses of companies that seek a listing on the SEHK are posted
on the website of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing. See Listed Company
Information Advanced Search – Current Securities, http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/
listconews/advancedsearch/search_active_main.asp (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Advanced Search – Current Securities]; see also Desk Survey, supra note 50.
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Table 1: Participation of cornerstone investors in IPOs during 2006 59
Name of company

Amt sought
from IPO
(HK$B)

Number of
cornerstone
investors

Total amount
committed
(HK$M)

Lock-up
period
(months)

Nine Dragons Paper
(Holdings) Ltd.

$3.4
(US$435.9m)

3

$468
(US$60m)

6

Bank of China Ltd.
H-Shares

$76.7
(US$9.83b)

12

$17,521
(US$2,246m)

12

China BlueChemical
Ltd. H-Shares

$2.66
(US$341m)

4

$646
(US$82.8m)

9

Industrial &
Commercial Bank of
China Ltd. H-Shares

$108.65
(US$13.93b)

13

$30,800
(US$3,948.7m)

12

$2.19
(US$280.1m)

4

$341
(US$43.7m)

6

$16.1
(US$2.06b)

3

$1,950
(US$250m)

12

$2.42
(US$310.3m)
$13.15b
(US$1.69b)

2

Zhaojin Mining
Industry Co. Ltd.
H-Shares
China
Communications
Construction Co.
Ltd. H-Shares
Shanghai Jin Jiang
Int’l Hotels (Group)
Co. Ltd. H-Shares
China Coal Energy
Co. Ltd. H-Shares

5

$312
(US$40m)
$1,950
(US$250m)

6
12

Appendix II sets out the beneficial owners of cornerstone investors
and the size of their individual investments as published in the prospectuses. The last column calculates the approximate percentage of all
the shares from the IPO that was allotted to these investors based on the
final offer price as announced by the company. The ensuing paragraphs
review some of the more significant features of these arrangements in
Hong Kong.
59. See Advanced Search – Current Securities, supra note 58; see also Desk
Survey, supra note 50. The stock codes for the companies in Table 1 are Nine Dragons
Paper (2689), Bank of China (3988), China BlueChemical (3983), ICBC (1398),
Zhaojing Mining (1818), China Communications Construction (1800), Shanghai Jin
Jiang (2006) and China Coal (1898). For links to electronic copies of each of the listed
companies’ prospectuses, see infra note 75.
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A. Who are the cornerstone investors?
The cornerstone investors are among the “Who’s Who” in Hong
Kong and figure prominently among its richest citizens. 60 Individuals
from the January 2007 Forbes Asia list included Dr. Lee Shau Kee, who
ranked second with a net worth estimated at US$16.5 billion; 61 Dato Dr.
Cheng Yu Tung who ranked seventh with a net worth of US$6.5 billion;
Mr. Peter Woo Kwong Ching, whose US$2.7 billion placed him fourteenth on the list; and Mr. Chen Din Hwa, who came close behind with
US$2.6 billion. 62 Although not on the Greater China list, the presence
of Mr. Kuok Hock Nien is also significant as he ranked among the
richest people in the world with diversified business interests in
plantations, media, hotels and property. 63
A number of prominent companies that are listed on the SEHK also
appear consistently on the list of cornerstone investors. These include
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited and its subsidiary Hutchison
Whampoa Limited, which boasts Dr. Li Ka Shing, the richest man in
Hong Kong as of January 2007, as its controlling shareholder. 64 The list
also includes Sun Hung Kai Properties Limited, which is controlled by
the Kwok brothers, 65 and Chinese Estates Holdings Limited, which is
run by Mr. Joseph Lau. 66
60. See Greater China’s Richest: The Top 40, FORBES ASIA, Jan. 29 2007,
available at http://www.forbes.com/global/2007/0129/035.html [hereinafter China’s
Top 40].
61. It is telling that the reference to Dr. Lee in Forbes Asia reads as follows:
“Made fortune in property as founder of Henderson Land. Adding to wealth through
investments in such recent IPOs as Nine Dragons.” Dr. Lee who is known as “Hong
Kong’s Warren Buffet” in the market has been widely reported in the local media as
saying that there is more profit to be made in equities than in property development.
See Jeffrey Tam, Lee Talks Up Equities for New Year, THE STANDARD, Jan. 2, 2007, at
A3; Danny Chung, Lee Focus Pledge, THE STANDARD, Dec. 13 2006, at A1.
62. See China’s Top 40, supra note 60.
63. See The World’s Richest People: #114 Robert Kuok, FORBES.COM, http://www.
forbes.com/lists/2006/10/ARHN.html (with an estimated net worth of about US$5
billion Mr. Kuok ranked as 114th in the world in 2006).
64. See China’s Top 40, supra note 60. Forbes Asia estimated the net worth of Dr.
Li to be about US$22 billion. Id.
65. Id. The brothers Raymond, Thomas and Walter Kwok are collectively estimated to be worth an estimated US$14 billion by Forbes Asia, which places them as the
third richest in Hong Kong.
66. Id. At an estimated net worth of US$1.95 billion, Mr. Lau ranks 23rd on the
Forbes list. He recently set a world record for purchasing the most expensive Andy
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Tycoons aside, yet another group of prominent cornerstone investors to emerge in 2006 was state-owned investment companies, which
include the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation 67 the
Kuwait Investment Authority 68 and the Qatar Investment Authority.69
Together, these three entities purchased HK$10 billion (US$1.28 billion)
of shares during the IPO of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of
China Limited, and were allotted about 9.19 percent of all of the shares
offered. 70 In addition, the Mainland Chinese government-controlled
China Life Insurance (Group) Company Limited and its SEHK-listed
subsidiary, China Life Insurance Company Limited, were featured as
cornerstone investors in four of the IPOs: Bank of China Limited, the
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Communications Construction Company Limited and China Coal Energy
Company Limited. 71
B. Lock-up period
The “lock-up” period refers to the duration of time following the
listing date during which cornerstone investors are not permitted – directly or indirectly – to dispose of the shares that they have been allotted
during the IPO. 72 The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the
shares are not “flipped” for immediate profit akin the practice of
“spinning” described above. This restriction, however, does not appear
to be an absolute prohibition since its language allows for a degree of
flexibility, enabling early disposals of the shares by cornerstone

Warhol painting, “Mao”, for US$17.5 million. Id.
67. Government of Singapore Investment Corp. (GIC), http://www.gic.com.sg (last
visited Feb. 15, 2009).
68. Kuwait Investment Authority, http://www.kia.gov.kw (last visited Feb. 15,
2009).
69. The Qatar Investment Authority, http://www.qia.qa/QIA (last visited Feb. 15,
2009).
70. See ICBC IPO Announcement Result, http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/list
conews/sehk/20061026/1398/F104.pdf (highlighting the allocation to corporate (cornerstone) investors). The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation was also a
cornerstone investor in China Communications Construction Company, Ltd., where it
received about 4.03 percent of all of the shares sold during the IPO in return for its
investment of HK$650 million, or about US$83.33 million. Id.
71. See Desk Survey, supra note 50; Table 1, supra note 59.
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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investors with the company’s consent. For example, the prospectus of
Bank of China Limited – H-Share states that:
Each Corporate Investor and its respective investor parent (if any)
has agreed that, without our prior written consent or that of the Joint
Global Coordinators, it will not, whether directly or indirectly, at any
time during the period of twelve months following the Listing Date,
dispose of any H Shares subscribed pursuant to the International
Offering (or any interest in any company or entity holding any of the
H Shares), other than transfers to another company which is and will
remain wholly-owned by the Corporate Investor or its investor
parent or, in certain cases, its holding company, and such transfer
can only be made when the transferee agrees to be subject to the
73
restrictions on disposals imposed on the Corporate Investor.

The prospectuses of seven other companies whose IPOs had cornerstone investors featured language similar to the foregoing condition,
save for some differences in the ‘lock up’ period. 74 The term “Corporate
Investor” was used by all but one of the companies, the exception being
Shanghai Jin Jiang International Hotels (Group) Company Limited
which used the term “Cornerstone Investor” in its prospectus. 75
Although the lock-up period for China BlueChemical Limited was
ostensibly nine months, a closer review of its terms reveals a clause that
mitigated its restrictiveness. The cornerstone investor
may freely transfer or otherwise dispose of such number of H Shares
that constitute up to 50 percent of the H Shares subscribed for pursuant to the relevant corporate placing agreement without the consent of our Company and the Joint Global Coordinators at any time

73.
74.

See Prospectus of the Bank of China, Ltd., supra note 18, at 119.
See Nine Dragons Paper (2689) 138, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/
listedco/listconews/sehk/20060220/02689/EWP117.pdf; China BlueChemical (3983)
266-67, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060918/0398
3/EWP125.pdf; ICBC (1398) 101, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listco
news/sehk/20061016/01398/EWP114.pdf; Zhaojing Mining (1818) 101, available at
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20061124/01818/F116.pdf;
China
Communications Construction (1800) 67, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco
/listconews/sehk/20061201/1800/F115_e.pdf; Shanghai Jin Jiang (2006) 278, available
at
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20061130/02006/EWP126.pdf;
China Coal (1898) 224, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/
20061206/1898/F124_e.pdf.
75. Supra note 74.
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and from time to time after the date falling six months from the
76
Listing Date.

The effective lock-up period was therefore six months for half of
the shares allotted and nine months for the balance, and may be further
varied with the consent of the company.77
Except as disclosed in the prospectus, there was no requirement for
either the company or its cornerstone investors to provide information
regarding any granting of approval for disposals of shares within the
lock-up period. 78 Furthermore, as their equity holding was invariably
below five percent of the issued capital of the company, cornerstone investors were not classified as “substantial shareholders,” which are required to disclose acquisitions and disposals of their shares. 79 Taken together, these factors contributed to an undesirable lack of transparency
for share transactions by cornerstone investors within the lock-up period,
as their activities may have ranged from the purchase of shares or, with
the written consent of the company, a sale of shares within the initial
allocation of shares from the IPO.
C. Preferred and guaranteed allotment
In return for their commitments, cornerstone investors are accorded
priority status in the allotment of shares during IPOs. Corporate placing
agreements include the following term:
The Offer Shares to be subscribed by each of the Corporate Investors
will not be affected by any reallocation of the Offer Shares between
the International Offering and the Hong Kong Public Offering in the
event of over-subscription under the Hong Kong Public Offering as
80
described.

76. See China BlueChemical (3983) 266-67, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/
listedco/listconews/sehk/20060918/03983/EWP125.pdf.
77. See id.
78. As the arrangement for cornerstone investors is by definition a private contract
between the company, its underwriters and the investor, this information is not subject
to any further disclosure, save for what appears in the prospectus as well as the
announcement on the IPO Allotment Results.
79. See Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance, supra note 22, § 15.
80. Prospectus of the Bank of China, Ltd., supra note 18, at 114. The prospectuses
of the other seven companies whose IPOs had cornerstone investors contained the same
statement or words to similar effect.
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The allotment of shares to cornerstone investors is thus contractually guaranteed and the only aspect that remains to be determined is the
final offer price used for the computation of the number of shares. This
preferred allotment is not affected by the rate of oversubscription for the
Hong Kong Public Offer that triggers the application of the “clawback”
provisions of Practice Note 18. 81 In short, the parties who would lose
out from any reallocation of shares from the International Offer Share
tranche to the Hong Kong Offer Share tranche would be institutional
investors who are not accorded the status of cornerstone investors.
While the provisions of Practice Note 18 effectively require the
company to disclose the rate of oversubscription for the retail tranche of
its IPO, there is no corresponding requirement for the company to do so
for its International Offer Share portion. Instead of providing a precise
number, companies may choose to use terms such as “significantly”,
“substantially” or “well” oversubscribed to describe the institutional
demand. This makes it difficult to quantify the overall demand for the
shares of a company during its IPO. 82 Indeed, the International Offer
Shares portion of seven of the eight IPOs that involved cornerstone
investors in 2006 were “very substantially over-subscribed,” making it
reasonable to draw two conclusions. 83 First, there was substantially
more demand than supply of shares, which in turn means that all institutional investors likely received fewer shares than they had sought.
Second, these investors would seek to rebalance their investment portfolios through the acquisition of additional shares on the open market
when trading commenced. All else being equal, this demand virtually
guaranteed that the shares would experience a strong performance in
terms of price to the benefit of those who were fortunate enough to be
allotted shares during the IPO.
Notably, the average rate of oversubscription for the retail tranche
of the eight IPOs that had cornerstone investors in 2006 was about 308
times. 84 Under normal circumstances, this would require a readjustment
of the number of Hong Kong Public Offer Shares to 50 percent of the
81. See PRACTICE NOTE 18, supra note 38; see also infra discussion in the section
titled “Waiver of Practice Note 18.”
82. See infra Table 2; see also infra note 92.
83. Id. The exception is Zhaojin Mining Industry Company, Ltd., which reported
that the International Offer Shares tranche of its IPO was “significantly oversubscribed.” Id.
84. Computed by author as an average based on the actual rates of oversubscriptions as set out in Table 2.
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total number of shares available during the IPO, thus further decreasing
the number of shares that institutional investors – excluding cornerstone
investors – could expect to receive under the International Offer Share
portion. 85 It is against this background that the guarantee of allocation
of shares to cornerstone investors is particularly significant, especially
coming as it did during a year when the average rate of oversubscription
of the Hong Kong Public Offer portion exceeded 250 times, with the
retail tranche of at least ten IPOs being over-subscribed by 500 times or
more. 86
Collectively, cornerstone investors were allotted an average of almost 28 percent of the adjusted number of International Offer Shares
from the eight IPOs in which they participated. 87 This ranged from approximately 15.1 percent for China Communications Construction
Company Limited – H-Share, to 48.5 percent for China BlueChemical
Limited – H-Share. 88 The latter is especially significant, as there were
only four cornerstone investors who were able to secure almost one-half
of all the International Offer Shares with a collective investment of
about HK$646 million (US$82.8 million) despite the company’s announcement that this tranche was “very significantly over-subscribed”. 89
Of more fundamental importance is the fact that the engagement of
cornerstone investors by companies concentrated shareholdings in the
hands of a select and privileged few, rather than ensuring the widest
possible base of shareholders.
85. See PRACTICE NOTE 18, supra note 38. Cornerstone investors therefore enjoy a
preferential status since their allocation is fixed and is not subject to any reduction
regardless of the rate of over subscription for the retail tranche unlike other institutional
investors. In return, however, the cornerstone investors agree not to dispose of their
shares within a specified lock-in period.
86. See C. K. Low, Initial Public Offerings and Interest Income in Hong Kong, 18
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 559 (2007).
87. Table 2 sets out the statistics from hand-collected data from various announcements by the company, including its prospectus and IPO Allotment Results. The adjusted number of shares reflects the reallocation to the retail tranche based on the clawback provisions of Practice Note 18, but excludes any shares that the company may subsequently issue to institutional investors under the green shoe over allotment option.
See infra section titled “Waiver of Practice Note 18.”
88. See infra section titled “Waiver of Practice Note 18.”
89. See China BlueChemical, Ltd., IPO Allotment Results, available at
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060928/LTN20060928001.htm.
The four cornerstone investors were allotted an aggregate of about 24.27 percent of the
total number of shares offered in the IPO before the exercise of the green shoe over
allotment option by the underwriters.
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Table 2 below provides a succinct summary of the preferred positions of cornerstone investors who were guaranteed allotments of shares
from the International Offer Share portion of IPOs in 2006.
Table 2: Clawback effect of application of Practice Note 18 90
Percentage of
International
Offer Shares
allotted to
cornerstone
investors

Name of
company

Rate of over
subscription
for Hong
Kong Offer
Shares

Revised
number of
Int’l Offer
Shares
(Millions)

Nine Dragons
Paper (Holdings)
Limited

520.45

500

Bank of China
Ltd. H-Share

70.9

23,011.731

477.56

700

75.74

31,851.9

Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed

86.4

Significantly
Oversubscribed

31.12

2,800

Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed

15.13

550

Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed

25.78

2,597.098

Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed

18.48

China
BlueChemical
Ltd. H-Share
Industrial &
Commercial
Bank of China
Ltd. H-Share
Zhaojin Mining
Industry Co. Ltd.
H-Share
China
Communications
Construction Co.
Ltd. H-Share
Shanghai Jin
Jiang
International
Hotels (Group)
Co. Ltd. H-Share
China Coal
Energy Co. Ltd.
H-Share

90.

535.75

219.97

382.18

182.08

See Desk Survey, supra note 50.

Rate of over
subscription for
International
Offer Shares
Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed
Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed
Very
Significantly
Oversubscribed

27.52
25.8
48.57
31.49
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D. Waiver of Practice Note 18
Four companies, namely Bank of China Limited, the Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China Limited, China Communications
Construction Company Limited, and China Coal Energy Company
Limited, sought and received a waiver from strict compliance of Practice
Note 18, thus amplifying the share concentration effects that cornerstone
investors had during the 2006 IPOs. 91 The underlying rationale for the
waiver was that it is generally more difficult and costly to market largesized IPOs to retail investors. 92 Given the uncertainty of demand for the
Hong Kong Offer Share portion, it was deemed more prudent to reduce
the initial size of this tranche and reallocate these shares to the International Offer Share tranche because interest from institutional investors
is relatively easier to ascertain from the road shows that the company
conducts. 93
These waivers work at two levels. 94 First, the Hong Kong Public
Offer Shares portion of the IPO is halved from the usual ten percent to
five percent. Second, in the event of significant oversubscription of the
retail tranche, the reallocation, or “clawback”, from the International
Offer Shares portion is substantially reduced from its customary levels
under Practice Note 18. Such waivers were relatively uncommon prior
to 2006, as only eight were granted in total. One such waiver was granted in each of the years 2001, 2002 and 2003; two were granted in 2004
and three in 2005. 95 Their popularity has increased steadily in recent
91. This data was hand-collected by the author from a review of the prospectuses
of the companies. The waiver was also granted to a fifth company, China Merchants
Bank Co., Ltd., but this is not pertinent to the current discussions as its IPO did not have
any cornerstone investors. It is interesting to note, however, that these are coincidentally the five largest IPOs for 2006. See Structure of Global Offering 352-54, available at
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060908/03968/EWP124.pdf.
92. The usual practice of the SEHK is to consider such Practice Note 18 waiver
applications only where the size of the IPO exceeds HK$10 billion, or US$1.28 billion,
before the exercise of the green shoe over-allotment option. This practice is consistent
with Rule 8.08(1)(d) which allows for the exercise of discretion on the part of the
SEHK to reduce the public shareholding base to 15 percent of the issued capital of a
company which market capitalization is expected to exceed HK$10 billion on its listing.
See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, at R. 8.08.
93. Based on market observation from discussions with investment bankers.
94. See infra note 101.
95. From a review of prospectuses the waivers were previously granted to
CNOOC, Ltd., in 2001, China Telecom, Ltd. in 2002, China Life Insurance, Ltd. in
2003, SMIC Ltd. and Ping An Insurance, Ltd. in 2005, and China Construction Bank,
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years, however, congruent with the listings of larger Mainland Chinese
enterprises on the SEHK.
The table below illustrates the effect that such waivers have in
markedly reducing the number of shares that would otherwise be
available for subscription by retail investors thereby depriving them of a
higher degree of participation especially for the ‘hot’ IPOs that were
prevalent in 2006.
Table 3: Effect of waivers of Practice Note 18 on
Hong Kong Offer Share portion of IPO 96

Normal
Practice
With
waivers

Initial
percentage
of IPO set
aside for
Hong Kong
Public Offer

Clawback
adjustment for
oversubscription
of between
15 and 50 times

Clawback
adjustment for
oversubscription
of between
50 to 100 times

Clawback
adjustment if
oversubscription
exceeds 100
times

10%

30%

40%

50%

5%

7.5%

10%

20%

One consequence of granting such waivers is the retail frenzy that is
generated over IPOs. As with the company, retail investors face the
uncertainty of not knowing what the demand will eventually be for the
Public Offer Shares, as this will only be determined at the close of the
IPO. Recognizing that the size of the “clawback” provisions is reduced
in tandem with the initial allocation for the retail tranche of the IPO,
investors have turned increasingly towards the use of margin
financing. 97
Ltd., China Shenhua Ltd. and Bank of Communications, Ltd. in 2005. All of the
foregoing are H Shares. See supra note 75 (providing links to electronic copies of each
of the listed companies’ prospectuses).
96. The figures presented in this Table are based on announcements by brokers
concerning the provision of such financing during IPOs and the author’s experience.
97. The term “margin financing” refers to the amount of money that investors
borrow for the purposes of purchasing securities, which includes shares offered during
IPOs. See The Free Dictionary, Financial Dictionary, Margin, http://financial-diction
ary.thefreedictionary.com/Margin (last visited Feb. 6, 2009); Deacons, Tightening
Securities Margin Financing in Hong Kong (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.hg.org/
articles/article_468.html.
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As the shares of China Coal Energy Company Limited IPO’d at
HK$4.05 and closed at HK$4.56 at the end of its first day of trading on
the SEHK, 98 an investor with one board lot of shares would have made a
gross profit of approximately HK$510, assuming that he or she managed
to sell the shares at the closing price. This profit, however, does not take
into account the costs, the principal components of which would include
brokerage for both subscribing for and selling the shares, application
fees (if any) and the interest that is incurred on the margin financing.
The following table illustrates the effects that the waivers may have
had indirectly on contributing to increases in the size of the applications
– and the costs thereof – to the retail investor just to be assured of being
allocated one board lot of shares. It should be noted that Bank of China
Limited pursued a policy which guaranteed every single retail investor
one board lot of 1,000 shares to encourage them to apply for its IPO.
Table 4: Size and cost of application to be assured allotment of one board
lot where waivers of Practice Note 18 have been granted by the SEHK 99
Name of company

Number of shares to apply
for to be assured of one
board lot

Bank of China Ltd. H-Share

1000

Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China Ltd. H-Share
China Communications
Construction Co. Ltd. HShare
China Coal Energy Co. Ltd.
H-Share
China Merchants Bank Co.
Ltd. H-Share

Cost of
subscription
(HK$)
3030.30

6000

18,606.04

20000

92,928.28

25000
5000

102,271.61
43,181.78

The foregoing analysis raises three questions that may be posed by
retail investors. First, is the waiver of Practice Note 18 necessary or

98. See Yahoo! Finance, www.finance.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2009);
China Coal Energy Co. Lists in Hong Kong, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 19, 2006,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200612/19/eng20061219_334087.html.
99. The details as set out in Table 4 were hand collected from the IPO Allotment
Results announcements by the companies. Disclosure as set out under the “Basis of
Allotment under the Hong Kong Public Share Offering” was examined to determine the
level of application required to secure the allotment of one board lot of shares.
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equitable? Second, should such a waiver be granted in cases that involve cornerstone investors who are assured of being allotted a significant number of these highly sought after shares? Lastly, why should
investors who put up all of their application monies up-front be subject
to such uncertainties, especially in view of the investments necessary to
be assured of being allotted one board lot of the shares of the company? 100
E. Bottom line: How profitable is it to be a cornerstone investor?
There is no dispute that cornerstone investors expose themselves to
a degree of risk that is inherent in any IPO. For example, the issue may
not be well received by other investors or it may be affected by externalities, either before the listing of the company or during the lock-up
period, that may cause a decline in the price of the shares.
This risk appeared to be neither material nor substantial, however,
at least during the 2006 IPO boom. Concededly, as of December 31,
2006, the lock-up period had only expired for one of the eight IPOs,
Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings) Limited, whose shares closed at
HK$6.97 on September 4, 2006, the first trading day after the lock-up
period. 101 Had the three cornerstone investors sold all of their shareholdings at that price on that day, they would have more than doubled
their money on the investment with a collective profit estimated at
HK$491.4 million before costs. 102 Nevertheless, the cornerstone investtors would have done much better had they kept their shareholdings
through the end of 2006, as the company was the best performing IPO of
100. In the interest of full disclosure, the author was appointed as a member of the
Listing Committee of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong on May 19, 2006 and has
participated in the hearings of a number of listing applications as well as of other issues
since then. The views expressed in this Article are solely and exclusively those of the
author in his personal capacity.
101. See Yahoo! Finance, supra note 98; see also UK & Ireland Yahoo! Finance,
Nine Dragons Paper Historical Prices (Sept. 4, 2006), http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/q/hp
?s=N3Y.BE&b=4&a=08&c=2006&e=4&d=08&f=2006 (listing the historical share
price for Sept. 4, 2006 in United Kingdom currency).
102. As they are not defined as substantial shareholders of the company the
cornerstone investors are under no obligation to notify the company and/or the SEHK of
the sale of their shares. The profit of some US$63 million is based on the three cornerstone investors being collectively allotted about 137.64 million shares in return for the
US$60 million that they invested. The profit would have been HK$3.57 for each share,
ignoring transaction costs.
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the year. Its shares closed at HK$13.40 on December 29, 2006, representing a 294 percent premium over its IPO price. 103 The following
table highlights the gross unrealized gains attained by the cornerstone
investors of the other seven IPOs in which they participated. These
gains are particularly impressive when one considers that three of the
companies were only listed on the SEHK from December 2006. 104
Table 5: Return on investment for cornerstone investors in 2006 105
Name of company
Bank of China Ltd.
H-Share
China BlueChemical Ltd.
H-Share
Industrial & Commercial
Bank of China Ltd. HShare
Zhaojin Mining Industry
Co. Ltd. H-Share
China Communications
Construction
Co. Ltd. H-Share
Shanghai Jin Jiang Int’l
Hotels (Group) Co. Ltd.
H-Share
China Coal Energy Co.
Ltd. H-Share
Avg. % gain to end 2006

IPO Date

IPO Offer
Price
(HK$)

Closing
share price
12/29/06

% gain on
investment

6/01/06

2.95

4.27

44.75

9/29/06

1.90

3.15

65.79

10/27/06

3.07

4.83

57.33

12/08/06

12.68

15.52

22.4

12/15/06

4.60

7.69

67.17

12/15/06

2.20

3.73

69.55

12/19/06

4.05

5.05

24.69

N/A

N/A

50.24

103. The last trading day for the year was December 29, 2006. If the cornerstone
investors had sold all of their shareholdings at the closing price for the day, they would
have had HK$10, or US$1.28, per share for a collective gross profit of about HK$1.37
billion, or US$176.4 million.
104. Bank of China, Ltd. was listed on the SEHK on June 1st, China BlueChemical,
Ltd., on September 29th, and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China on October
27th, while Zhaojin Mining Industry Company, Ltd. and China Communications
Construction Company, Ltd., Shanghai Jin Jiang International Hotels (Group) Company
Ltd. and China Coal Energy Company Ltd., were listed on December 8th, 15th and 19th
of 2006, respectively. TodayIR, http://www.todayir.com/e/ipo_2006.php (last visited
February 15, 2009). The lock-up periods for these companies had not expired as of
December 31, 2006. See Table 1 infra and Appendix I supra.
105. See New Listing Report 2006, supra note 15 (setting out the IPO Date and IPO
Offer Price). The closing price is obtained from Yahoo! Finance, www.finance.
yahoo.com.
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The foregoing provides a succinct snapshot of the enviable rates of
return achieved by the cornerstone investors in the months or weeks
since their initial investments in the companies. Admittedly, these
figures did not represent realized gains, as the cornerstone investors
were obliged to retain these shares through the end of the lock-up period
unless the company consented in writing to an earlier disposal of the
same. Furthermore, the high rates of return may have been influenced
by the general upward trend of the market. Nonetheless, these figures
provide strong evidence of the potentially significant profits to be made
by cornerstone investors, especially in markets similar to the SEHK in
2006, with first day returns averaging more than 22 percent for the fiftythree IPOs in that year. 106
The closing price of the shares on December 29, 2006 is used for
two principal reasons. First, it allows for the identification of a convenient and specific point of comparison to ensure consistency while
contemporaneously reflecting the interaction between market demand
and supply. Second, there is usually no provision of an official opening
price for a particular share by the stock exchange on which it is traded.
The closest to an official opening price might be the figure determined
by the single-auction pricing process during the pre-opening session.
For example, in the year 2002 the SEHK introduced the “Bid and Ask
Record” with the principal objective of assisting in the determination of
fair opening prices for shares, by disseminating 30-second snapshots of
the equilibrium prices during the pre-opening session for each share,
with the last equilibrium price before actual market opening adopted as
the best estimate of the single-auction price. 107 This is not necessarily a
transaction price, however, and the process may be subject to manipulation aimed at distorting the price discovery mechanism.

106. See Low, supra note 17, at 101; see also Sundeep Tucker, Hong Kong Warned
of Chinese IPO Dependence, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d9634
f66-a4ef-11db-b0ef-0000779e2340,dwp_uuid=9c33700c-4c86-11da-89df-0000779e23
40.html (acknowledging and describing how the listings of Mainland Chinese companies have benefited the development of the SEHK).
107. HKEx Data Products, Product Subscription, https://www.hkex.com.hk/ods/
English/asp/prdProfile.asp?prd=000000096&groupID=000000100&scheme=1
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2009).
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V. RETHINKING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Cornerstone investors have contributed to the development of the
market particularly during the initial listings of increasingly larger sized
Mainland Chinese companies at the turn of the new millennium. Their
participation helped provide the necessary confidence and stability of
share price without which the H-Share market might not be as buoyant
as it is today.
A case in point is that of China Telecom Corporation Limited,
whose IPO in November 2001 was marred by unfavorable market conditions and fundamental management errors, including the release of
earnings forecasts and information on planned acquisitions that were not
in the prospectus. 108 These factors contributed to the lackluster response
to its IPO, with an International Share Offer portion that was described
as being “fully subscribed” while the retail tranche was only 3.6 times
covered. 109 In that case, commentators noted that the investment of
US$50 million by Hutchison Whampoa Limited, a telecom and port
conglomerate controlled by Dr. Li Ka Shing, was “seen as a vote of
confidence in China Telecom by the territory’s retail investors.” 110
Although the Listing Rules do not specifically deal with the subject,
the issue of cornerstone investors is neither recent nor novel. Indeed, the
topic has been canvassed in a number of publications with headlines,
including: “HK Tycoons Pledge $500m for China Life IPO”;111
“Tycoons Get China Netcom IPO Rolling with $1.1b Pledge”; 112 “Hong

108. See China Telecom Corp., Ltd. 1, available at http://www.hkexnews.hk/listed
co/listconews/sehk/20021114/LTN20021114035.pdf.
109. Id. (using the term “fully subscribed” suggests a weak demand with the order
book possibly barely filled, despite the International Offer Shares being fully placed by
the underwriters).
110. See, e.g., Joe Leahy, Li Puts $50m into China Telecom IPO, FIN. TIMES
LONDON, Nov. 8, 2002, at 30. The IPO had to be priced at the lowest end of its indicative range of between prices. The company was set at HK$1.47 per H-Share. If
Hutchison Whampoa, Ltd. had held on to all of the shares allotted through the end of
2006, it would have achieved gross return on its investment of approximately 190
percent over five years, as the price of China Telecom Corp., Ltd., closed at HK$4.26
on December 29th, 2006.
111. See Joe Leahy, Angela MacKay & Francesco Guerrera, HK Tycoons Pledge
$500m for China Life IPO, FIN. TIMES LONDON, Dec. 5, 2003, at 1.
112. See Hui Yuk-min & Nicole Chan, Tycoons Get China Netcom IPO Rolling with
$1.1B Pledge, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 29, 2004, at 1.
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Kong Elite Score on IPO”; 113 “Chinese IPO Gets Star Investors”; 114 and
“Front Running in China”. 115 Taking a cue from these publications
(albeit not alluding specifically to cornerstone investors), the Listing
Committee of the SEHK in its 2006 Annual Report formed the opinion
that:
While the Committee does not consider pre-IPO placings shortly
before listing to be objectionable, the Committee considered that
preferential investment terms available only to pre-IPO investors
may at times be inconsistent with the principle that all holders of
listed securities are to be treated fairly and equally, memorialized in
Rule 2.03. This would particularly be the case in circumstances
where the terms of the pre-IPO investment meant that private equity
investors would not have experienced equity risks significantly
different from those experienced by public investors, or would be
protected from certain types of equity risks after listing in a manner
that was significantly different from that experienced by public
investors. In such cases the Committee considered it appropriate to
require the preferential terms to be removed or altered prior to listing
116
in order to satisfy the principles of Rule 2.03.

To the extent they apply, the General Principles of Rule 2.03
require that “all holders of listed securities are treated fairly and
equally” 117 as the rules attempt to secure for securities holders certain
assurances and equality of treatment which their legal positions might
not otherwise provide. But, while the ambit of Rule 2.03 and the issue
of pre-IPO placements have been considered in a number of separate
Listing Decisions, 118 none of these pertain to the specific circumstances
of cornerstone investors.
113.
114.
115.

See Kate Linebaugh, Star Treatment, supra note 18.
See Kate Linebaugh, Star Investors, supra note 18.
See Shu-Ching Jean Chen, Front-Running in China, FORBES, Dec. 1, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/business/2006/12/01/china-ipo-investors-biz-cx_jc_1201china
ipo.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
116. See THE LISTING COMM, ANNUAL REPORT 2006 7, para. 26 (2006), available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/listing/listcomrpt/AnnualRpt_2006.pdf.
117. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, R. 2.03(4), at 2-2, available at http://www.hk
ex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_2.pdf.
118. See Listing Decision HKEx-LD55-1 (June 2006), http://www.hkex.com.hk/
listing/listdec/listdec_dates_06_07.htm; Listing Decision HKEx-LD56-1 (Sept. 2006),
http://www.hkex.com.hk/listing/listdec/listdec_dates_06_08.htm (reaffirming the views
of Listing Decision HKEx-LD36-1 (Oct. 2003), http://www.hkex.com.hk/listing/listdec/
200310-1.doc).
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The discussion thus far highlights significant issues for policymakers and securities regulators in Hong Kong to resolve. First, is the
risk of having a less than definitive lock-up period a fair trade for the
certainty of securing shares in highly sought after IPOs? Second, does
the perpetuation of a system that enables cornerstone investors to be accorded privileged status in the allotment of shares facilitate or impair the
further development of the market? Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, does this issue pertain to the freedom of contract between companies and their underwriters in the lead up to an IPO, or has it become
an issue of circumventing the Listing Rules by contract?
One possible solution would be to refine the ambit of Practice Note
18 by expressly stating that the preferential allocation of shares before or
during an IPO would prima facie be presumed to be inconsistent with
the fair and equitable principles of the Listing Rules. This approach is
preferred for two principal reasons. First, a Practice Note issued pursuant to Rule 1.06 is intended “to assist issuers . . . or their advisers in
interpreting and complying with these Exchange Listing Rules.”119
Such an approach has the advantages of familiarity, expediency and
flexibility, as practitioners have adhered to the procedures and processes
since the introduction of Practice Note 18 in June 1998. It does not
completely prohibit participation by cornerstone investors, but rather, it
puts a burden on the company and its advisers to rebut the presumption
with substantial quantitative and qualitative assessments that are sufficiently objective to enable the Listing Committee of the SEHK to consider the merits of such an application.
Furthermore, as the foregoing does not involve any amendments to
the Listing Rules, it is unnecessary to undergo the time consuming procedure set out in Rule 2.05, which provides that any such amendments
must be “subject to the approval of the Commission under section 24 of
the Securities and Futures Ordinance.” 120 Section 24 of the Securities
and Futures Ordinance requires the SEHK to provide, inter alia, explanations of the purpose as well as the likely effects of such amendments, 121
which invariably necessitates a public consultation on the issue. Such
exercises tend to be cumbersome and fraught with conflicting opinions,
119. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2, R. 1.06, at 1-14, available at http://www.hk
ex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_1.pdf.http://www.hkex.com.hk/rule/listrules/Chapter_
1.pdf.
120. See LISTING RULES, supra note 2. The term ‘Commission’ refers to the
Securities and Futures Commission of Hong Kong.
121. See supra note 19, § 7.24(2), at 7-8.
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often reflecting the range of vested interests, making it rather difficult to
do much more than compromise on the lowest common denominator. 122
An amendment of the Listing Rules may also reduce the degree of flexibility afforded the SEHK, thereby depriving it of the discretion necessary to maintain its preeminent position in an increasingly competitive
world of financial markets.
A useful benchmark that the SEHK may adopt in its interpretation
of the revised Practice Note 18 may be to initially determine whether the
investor is classified as “purely financial” or “strategic” by the listing
company. In its present form, the company would most appropriately
define a cornerstone investor as a purely financial investor, as cornerstone investors primarily invest with the objective of securing an allotment of shares during an IPO. Such arrangements do not provide for
any participation in management or exchange of expertise between the
investor and the company, and the investment is usually made during the
road shows at which the corporate placement agreements are negotiated
and signed.
A strategic investor, on the other hand, is defined as a “[c]orporate
or individual investor[] that add[s] value to investments [it or he] makes
through industry and personal ties that can assist companies in raising
additional capital as well as provide assistance in the marketing and
sales process.” 123 Strategic investors normally make their investments in
the company well ahead of the planned IPO and their lock-up periods
tend to be for a longer duration.
All else being equal, a strategic investor has potentially more to
offer the company than a purely financial investor, who offers only an
investment of a specific amount of money. Naturally, the strategic investor should also give due consideration to the duration and quality of
the investment ahead of the IPO, as well as of the lock-up period thereafter. In addition, the company and its advisers could present evidence
of the potential long-term synergies that may result from closer relationships between the company and its strategic investors, which could enhance the benefit to all of its shareholders.
Nevertheless, the foregoing should not be the sole or primary test to
determine whether a particular strategic investor ought to be accorded
the status of a cornerstone investor. Rather, the overriding test must be

122.
123.

See supra note 70 (disclosure and disclaimer).
See VC Experts, Strategic Investors, http://vcexperts.com/vce/library/encyclo
pedia/glossary_view.asp?glossary_id=112 (last visited Jan. 22, 2009).
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whether such an arrangement would be consistent with the principles of
fairness and equality of the Listing Rules. Conversely, the proposal to
grant a person the preferential allocation of shares as a cornerstone investor should not by itself be seen as a breach of these principles, since
this must include an assessment of whether the cornerstone investor has
assumed a level of risk that is substantially above that of other investors.
In short, the issue of cornerstone investors should not be reduced to
a mere checklist, as these investors can contribute positively to the
healthy development of our capital markets. Rather, a critical assessment is required of their contribution to the company over and above the
investment of an amount of money during the IPO. In these circumstances, well-publicized and objectively established guidelines should
work better than rigid rules since, at the end of the day, it is the balanced
and dynamic process that is more important than just a simple arrival at
the eventual outcome.
VI. CONCLUSION
Seven of the eight IPOs that had cornerstone investors in 2006 have
at least one common feature, namely that they were H-Shares issued by
companies that were incorporated in Mainland China. The sole exception is Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings) Limited which, on closer examination, is not markedly different given the scale of its operations on the
Mainland as well as the fact that it reports in Renminbi. 124 All of these
IPOs were very substantially oversubscribed by both institutional and
retail investors who viewed investments in the People’s Republic of
China favorably given its strong economic growth through 2006, high
savings rate and the emergence of a middle class with an increasingly
consumption-based pattern of behavior.
The practice of introducing cornerstone investors was originally
designed to bolster the confidence of investors in what were essentially
semi-privatized state-owned enterprises in Mainland China whose track
records were at best uncertain. The marketing of such shares proved difficult during this embryonic stage, as there were many legitimate concerns over transparency and the complicated share structure of the companies, which included “non tradable shares”. 125
124. See Prospectus of Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings), Ltd., available at
http://www.hkex.com.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/20060220/LTN20060220006.htm.
125. Approximately two-thirds of the total market capitalizations of Mainland
Chinese companies are in the form of illiquid non-tradable shares whose legal status has
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Much has changed since the successful listing of the first H-Share,
Tsingtao Brewery Company Limited, on the SEHK on July 15, 1993.
The pace of reforms has accelerated, particularly since the December
2001 accession of Mainland China into the World Trade Organization,
whose obligations include the opening up of its domestic financial markets. As of January 2007, numerous micro and macro policy initiatives
were already implemented or were being implemented, including the
launch of the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor Programme 126 and
the increasing convergence of Mainland Chinese Generally Accepted
Accounting Practices with that of the International Financial Reporting
Standards. 127
In light of the foregoing, one must ask whether the practice of inviting the participation of cornerstone investors for IPOs has outlived its
purpose. Rather than being the investment backwaters as it was once regarded, Mainland China has metamorphosed into an economic powerhouse with expectations that it may become the second largest economy
in the world behind the United States. Furthermore, despite the supposed risks that are assumed by the cornerstone investors, the evidence
suggests that these risks were more perceived than actual in 2006, as the
IPOs were exceedingly well received. On a closer examination of the
returns that have been made on these investments, one must ask whether
such arrangements are intended to benefit the company or its cornerstone investors.
Although cornerstone investors do not violate the Listing Rules – as
there are no such provisions to begin with – there is nonetheless a legitimate concern about the fairness of such arrangements. It is difficult, at
not been definitively clarified. Their origins date back to 1991 to the gradual opening up
of stock markets under stringent socialist rules. The presence of these shares causes
distortions in the market based upon such concerns over issues like the protection of
shareholder rights as well as the possible negative effect of the sale of these stocks.
See, e.g., C. H. Kwan, Reforms of Non-tradable Shares Opening the Way for the
Privatization of Major State-owned Enterprises, 9 NOMURA CAPITAL MKT. REV. 1, 54
(2006), available at http://www.nicmr.com/nicmr/english/report/images/ico_reppdf.gif;
Frederick Balfour, A Banner Year for China’s Stock Markets, BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 26,
2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/dec2006/gb200612
26_389013.htm?chan=globalbiz_asia_investing.
126. See Yang Lei, ed., China relaxes QFII rules to attract more overseas
investment, GOV.cn, Aug. 25, 2006, http://english.gov.cn/2006-08/25/content_37028
3.htm.
127. See, e.g., DELOITTE, COMPARISON BETWEEN PRC GAAP & IFRS (Apr. 1,
2005), available at http://www.iasplus.com/dttpubs/2005ifrsprc.pdf.
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best, to justify their existence in increasingly dynamic markets, especially those like the SEHK in 2006, where demand for shares during
IPOs consistently far exceeded the supply. At worst, one could contend
that these arrangements serve primarily to allow the underwriters to
prefer a select group of investors, in breach of the principles of fairness
and equality that are espoused by the Listing Rules. Akin to the practice
of “spinning” that prevailed in the United States at the height of the dotcom era of the late 1990s, the practice of allocating shares to cornerstone
investors may well be Hong Kong’s very own version of “a sophisticated form of bribery”. 128

128.

See supra note 36.
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APPENDIX I: NEW LISTINGS ON THE MAIN BOARD OF THE STOCK
EXCHANGE OF HONG KONG

January 1 to December 31, 2006 129
Stock

Company Name

Listing

IPO

Total Funds

Total Funds

Code

(at time of listing)

Date

Subscription

Raised

Raised

(HK$M)

(US$M)

(dd/mm/yy) Price (HK$)
1 2398

Good Friend Int’l

11/01/06

1.130

79.1

10.141

12/01/06

3.330

989.922

126.913

09/02/06

1.000

180

23.077

10/02/06

2.200

506

64.872

N/A - By

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Holdings Inc.
2 3330

Lingbao Gold Co. Ltd.
H-Shares

3

919

Modern Beauty Salon
Holdings Ltd.

4 2788

Yorkey Optical Int’l
(Cayman) Ltd.

5

502

Pan Sino International

01/03/06

Holding Ltd.
6

457

O2Micro Int’l Ltd.

Introduction
02/03/06

N/A - By
Introduction

7 2689

Nine Dragons Paper

03/03/06

3.400

3,910

501.283

14/03/06

0.720

57.6

7.385

21/03/06

3.150

1,630.125

208.99

23/03/06

2.750

2,068.919

265.246

30/03/06

1.160

232

29.744

31/03/06

1.650

2,040.915

261.656

(Holdings) Ltd.
8

402

Ming Hing Holdings
Ltd.

9 3308

Golden Eagle Retail
Group Ltd.

10 3323 China National Building
Material Co. Ltd. HShares
11 707

Co-Prosperity Holdings

12 2626

Hunan Nonferrous

Ltd.
Metals Corp. Ltd.
H-Shares

129. Hong Kong Exchs. & Clearing, Ltd., http://www.hkex.com.hk/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2009).
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Stock

Company Name

Code

(at time of listing)

Listing

IPO

Date

Subscription

(dd/mm/yy) Price (HK$)
13 3355

Adv. Semiconductor

673

Total Funds

Total Funds

Raised

Raised

(HK$M)

(US$M)

07/04/06

1.600

748.256

95.93

27/04/06

2.100

1,450.357

185.943

28/04/06

2.575

2,487.45

318.904

11/05/06

1.260

362.25

46.442

24/05/06

1.880

1,249.636

160.21

01/06/06

2.950

86,741.44

11,120.697

06/06/06

0.550

11

1.41

09/06/06

0.860

86

11.026

21/06/06

1.690

399.263

51.188

23/06/06

1.000

60

7.692

05/07/06

1.060

74.497

9.551

05/07/06

6.250

4,277.453

548.391

13/07/06

8.220

3,069.155

393.481

13/07/06

1.700

131.376

16.843

N/A - By

0.00

0.00

Manufacturing Corp.
Ltd. H-Shares
14 2345

Shanghai Prime
Machinery Co. Ltd.
H-Shares

15 2880

Dalian Port (PDA) Co.
Ltd. H-Shares

16 3335

DBA
Telecommunication
(Asia) Holdings Ltd.

17 3382

Tianjin Port
Development Holdings

18 3988

Bank of China Ltd.
H-Shares

19 474

Winbox Int’l (Holdings)
Ltd.

20 527

Galaxy Semi-Conductor
Holdings Ltd.

21 549

Jilin Qifeng Chemical
Fiber Co., Ltd - H Shares

22 515

TC Interconnect
Holdings Ltd.

23 352

Fortune Sun (China)
Holdings Ltd.

24 813

Shimao Property
Holdings Ltd.

25 3900

Greentown China
Holdings Limited

26 3989

Hembly Int’l Holdings
Ltd.

27 3899 Enric Energy Equipment

20/07/06

Holdings Ltd.
28 3322 Win Hanverky Holdings

Introduction
06/09/06

2.280

786.6

100.846

21/09/06

1.380

158.7

20.346

Ltd.
29 3303

Jutal Offshore Oil
Services Ltd.
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Stock

Company Name

Code

(at time of listing)

Listing

IPO

Date

Subscription

(dd/mm/yy) Price (HK$)
30 3968

China Merchants Bank

31 3983

China BlueChemical

32 2700

Smart Union Group

Total Funds

Vol. XIV
Total Funds

Raised

Raised

(HK$M)

(US$M)

22/09/06

8.550

20,691

2,652.692

29/09/06

1.900

3,059

392.179

29/09/06

1.100

79.2

10.154

04/10/06

2.670

614.1

78.731

Co., Ltd. H-Shares
Ltd. H-Shares
(Holdings) Limited
33 637

Lee Kee Holdings

34 272

Shui On Land Ltd.

04/10/06

5.350

6,819.22

874.259

35 667

HannStar Board Int’l

06/10/06

1.770

604.013

77.438

Limited

Holdings Ltd.
36 320

Computime Group Ltd.

09/10/06

2.280

524.4

67.231

37 337

SPG Land (Holdings)

10/10/06

4.780

1,374.25

176.186

38 558

L.K. Technology

16/10/06

1.110

277.5

35.577

39 3918

NagaCorp Ltd.

19/10/06

1.430

822.25

105.417

27/10/06

3.070

124,947.926

16,018.964

27/10/06

1.020

102

13.077

07/12/06

7.730

6,377.25

817.596

08/12/06

1.230

288.558

36.995

08/12/06

2.200

3,266.969

418.842

08/12/06

12.680

2,519.706

323.039

Ltd.
Holdings Ltd.
40 1398 Industrial & Commercial
Bank of China Ltd.
H-Shares
41 609

Tiande Chemical

42 1888

Kingboard Laminates

43 477

AUPU Group Holding

44 552

China Communications

Holdings Ltd.
Holdings Ltd.
Co. Ltd.
Services Corp. Ltd.
H-Shares
45 1818 Zhaojin Mining Industry
Co. Ltd. H-Shares
Kingdom Holdings Ltd.

12/12/06

1.750

301.875

38.702

47 1800 China Communications

46 528

15/12/06

4.600

18,515

2,373.718

15/12/06

6.900

1,587

203.462

Construction Co. Ltd.
H-Shares
48 1868 Neo-Neon Holdings Ltd.
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Stock

Company Name

Code

(at time of listing)

Listing

IPO

Date

Subscription

(dd/mm/yy) Price (HK$)
49 2006 Shanghai Jin Jiang Int’l

15/12/06

2.200

675

Total Funds

Total Funds

Raised

Raised

(HK$M)

(US$M)

2,783

356.795

Hotels (Group) Co. Ltd.
H-Shares
50 1388

Embry Holdings Ltd.

51 1898 China Coal Energy Co.

18/12/06

3.620

362

46.41

19/12/06

4.050

15,119.987

1,938.46

20/12/06

5.300

2,197.613

281.745

Ltd. H-Shares
52 3898

Zhuzhou CSR Times
Electric Co., Ltd.
H-Shares

53 1399

SCUD Group Ltd.

21/12/06

2.020

603.98

77.433

54 1899

Xingda International

21/12/06

3.080

1,367.212

175.284

55 1882

Haitian Int’l Holdings

22/12/06

3.950

1,576.05

202.058

22/12/06

1.880

1,514.122

194.118

Total

332,083.193

42,574.768

Holdings Ltd.
Ltd.
56 1389 The Ming An (Holdings)
Co. Ltd.

Source: Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Limited

676

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

Vol. XIV

APPENDIX II: BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP OF AND ALLOCATIONS TO
CORNERSTONE INVESTORS DURING IPOS IN HONG KONG

January 1 to December 31, 2006 130
Name of company

Beneficial owner of

Amt. invested

Approx. % of all

cornerstone investor

HK$M

IPO shares allotted

(as stated in prospectus)

(US$M)

to cornerstone

Nine Dragons Paper

Mr. KUOK Hock Nien

156 ($20)

investor
4.58

(Holdings) Limited

Dato Dr. CHENG Yu
Tung

156 ($20)

4.58

Dr. LEE Shau Kee

156 ($20)

4.58

China Life Insurance
(Group) Co. Ltd.@

1,162.92 ($149)

1.54

China Life Insurance
Co. Ltd.@

1,162.92 ($149)

1.54

The Bank of East Asia,
Ltd.

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

The Bank of TokyoMitsubishi UFJ, Ltd

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Cheung Kong
(Holdings) Limited*

697.752 ($89.5)

0.92

Hutchsion Whampoa
Limited*

697.752 ($89.5)

0.92

Dato Dr. CHENG Yu
Tung

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Dr. LEE Shau Kee

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Mr. KUOK Hock Nien

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Mr. CHEN Din Hwa^

1,255.954 ($161)

1.66

Ms. CHEN Wai Wai
Vivien^

139.550 ($17.9)

0.18

Ping An Insurance
(Group) of China, Ltd.

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Sun Hung Kai
Properties Ltd.

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Bank of China
Limited
H-Shares

130.

Id.
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Sino Land Co. Ltd.

1,240.448 ($159)

1.64

1,395.504 ($178.9)

1.85

Dr. LEE Shau Kee

195 ($25)

7.33

Chinese Estates
Holdings Ltd.

195 ($25)

7.33

Bank of China Limited

156 ($20)

5.86

100 ($12.8)

3.75

China Life Insurance
(Group) Co. Ltd.@

4,400 ($564.1)

4.04

China Life Insurance
Company Limited@

2,000 ($256.4)

1.84

Cheung Kong
(Holdings) Limited*

800 ($102.6)

0.73

Hutchsion Whampoa
Limited*

800 ($102.6)

0.73

Dato Dr CHENG Yu
Tung

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

CITIC Pacific Limited

800 ($102.6)

0.73

Mr. YUNG Chi Kin

800 ($102.6)

0.73

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

Government of
Singapore Investment
Corp.

2,800 ($359)

2.57

Mr. KUOK Hock Nien

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

Kuwait Investment
Authority

5,600 ($717.9)

5.15

Mr. CHEN Din Hwa^

1,440 ($184.6)

1.32

Ms. CHEN Wai Wai
Vivien^

160 ($20.5)

0.14

Qatar Investment
Authority

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

Sun Hung Kai
Properties Limited

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

United Overseas Bank
Limited

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

Mr. Peter WOO Kwong
Ching

1,600 ($205.1)

1.47

Mr. Peter WOO Kwong
Ching
China BlueChemical
Ltd.
H-Shares

China Cinda Asset
Management Corp.
Industrial and
Commercial Bank of
China Limited
H-Shares
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Zhaojin Mining

Standard Bank Plc

93 ($11.9)

4.24

Industry Co. Ltd.

Mr, HO Tsu Kwok,
Charles

93 ($11.9)

4.24

Dr. LO Ka Shui

77.5 ($9.9)

3.53

Global Investment
House

77.5 ($9.9)

3.53

China Life Insurance
(Group) Co. Ltd.@

650 ($83.3)

4.03

Dato Dr. CHENG Yu
Tung

650 ($83.3)

4.03

Government of
Singapore Investment
Corp.

650 ($83.3)

4.03

Shanghai Jin Jiang

Bank of China Limited

156 ($20)

6.44

International Hotels

Dr. The Hon. Sir David
LI Kwok Po

156 ($20)

6.44

Cheung Kong
(Holdings) Limited

390 ($50)

2.96

China Life Insurance
(Group) Co. Ltd.@

390 ($50)

2.96

Dato Dr. CHENG Yu
Tung

390 ($50)

2.96

195 ($25)

1.48

195 ($25)

1.48

390 ($50)

2.96

H-Shares

China
Communications
Construction Co.
Ltd. H-Shares

(Group) Co. Ltd.
H-Shares
China Coal Energy
Company Limited
H-Shares

CITIC Pacific Limited
Mr. YUNG Chi Kin
Dr. LEE Shau Kee

Notes:
The IPO Shares do not include any green shoe over allotment options that are exercised.
All commitments in US$ are converted to its Hong Kong counterpart at the rate of US$1 to
HK$7.80.
The percentages are rounded down to the nearest second decimal point.
*
Hutchison Whampoa Limited is a subsidiary of Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited.
Both companies are listed on the SEHK.
@
China Life Insurance Company Limited is listed on the SEHK and is a subsidiary of
China Life Insurance (Group) Company Limited, the latter of which is a state-owned financial and insurance enterprise.
^
Mr. CHEN Din Hwa and Ms. CHEN Wai Wai Vivien are related and together control
the unlisted Nan Fung Group Limited whose corporate interests span cotton spinning, shipping, construction, real estate management, and share and securities investments.

